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A B S T R A C T   
Inspired by models of self-organized criticality, a family of measures quantifies long-range correlations in neural 
and behavioral activity in the form of self-similar (e.g., power-law scaled) patterns across a range of scales. Long- 
range correlations are often taken as evidence that a system is near a critical transition, suggesting interaction- 
dominant, softly assembled relations between its parts. Psychologists and neuroscientists frequently use power- 
law scaling as evidence of critical regimes and soft assembly in neural and cognitive activity. Critics, however, 
argue that this methodology operates at most at the level of an analogy between cognitive and other natural 
phenomena. This is because power-laws do not provide information about a particular system’s organization or 
what makes it specifically cognitive. We respond to this criticism using recent work in Integrated Information 
Theory. We propose a more principled understanding of criticality as a system’s susceptibility to changes in its 
own integration, a property cognitive agents are expected to manifest. We contrast critical integration with 
power-law measures and find the former more informative about the underlying processes.   
1. Should we expect cognitive agents to behave like critical 
systems? 
Cognitive performance is the result of many interacting processes 
comprising brain, body, and environment (e.g., Beer, 2000, 2008; Byrge 
et al., 2014; Chiel and Beer, 1997). These interactions can be complex 
and nonlinear, and often require explanations in terms of emergent 
properties and global parameters (e.g., Kelso, 1995; Turkheimer et al., 
2019). In general, however, even when not explicitly advocated, a 
framework of modular thinking prevails when seeking functionalist 
explanations of cognitive phenomena. Such explanations rely on the 
assumption of near-decomposability (Simon, 1996). Cognitive function 
is assumed to be the result of dedicated information-processing mech-
anisms typically associated with a particular kind of cognitive capa-
bility. Empirical observations repeatedly challenge assumptions of 
modularity by showing that cognitive performance is embedded in a 
series of correlations occurring at various scales, both in terms of the 
processes involved (neural, musculoskeletal, hormonal, interactive, 
ecological, social) as well as timescales (coordination in neural 
population, microgenesis of movement and perception, streams of 
behavior, learning, habits, development, and so on; Anderson et al., 
2012; Kello et al., 2008, 2010). Such cross-scale correlations are not 
expected in nearly-decomposable systems (Simon, 1996). This fact leads 
to alternative proposals concerning the organization of environmentally 
situated brains and bodies. A cognitive organization that fits empirical 
observations is one where multiple interacting components can be 
recombined from moment to moment on the basis of context, task, and 
developmental history. Such systems are sometimes referred to as dis-
playing multiplicative interactions, interaction-dominant dynamics 
(Van Orden et al., 2003) or soft assembly (Kello and Van Orden, 2009), 
in contradistinction to ‘near-decomposable’ component-dominant dy-
namics or hard-assembled modular organizations (Simon, 1977). 
Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for interaction- 
dominant dynamics in cognitive systems: e.g., that neural systems 
operate near a critical point in an order-disorder phase transition (Beggs, 
2008; Chialvo, 2010), that the brain is able to integrate functionally 
differentiated parts by finding states of metastable equilibrium (Kelso, 
1995), or that neural networks operate as a ‘dynamic core’ of regions 
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active across multiple tasks and integrating more specialized regions 
depending on context (Varela, 1995; Bell and Shine, 2016; Shine et al., 
2019). An influential reformulation of some of these ideas is provided by 
Integrated Information Theory (Tononi et al., 2016). Formulated as an 
answer to the problem of measuring conscious states, Integrated Infor-
mation Theory proposes that a system is conscious to the extent that it 
generates integrated information, that is, intrinsic information that is 
irreducible to the sum of its parts, considered independently. Integrated 
information, φ, is measured as the distance between the information 
circulation of the system as a whole and the information circulation 
under a minimal partition (i.e., the partition that minimizes this dis-
tance). Interestingly, different studies show that some systems present 
maximum integrated information precisely at their critical points 
(Aguilera and Di Paolo, 2019; Aguilera, 2019; Kim and Lee, 2019; 
Khajehabdollahi et al., 2019; Arsiwalla et al., 2017). This suggests there 
is a link between integrated information and criticality. 
An empirical test for the presence of interaction-dominant dynamics 
in cognitive systems is the observation of organized patterns of long- 
term correlations in performance variables during the execution of 
repeated tasks. Evidence of self-similarity (power-law scaling) in these 
correlations has driven some researchers to draw analogies with the 
physics of phase transitions in aggregate material processes, such as in 
the case of self-organized criticality (Bak et al., 1987; Beggs, 2008). By 
this analogy, operating near critical points would be a way for neural 
and cognitive systems to generate complex spatiotemporal patterns 
spanning many different correlated scales, implying system-wide 
coherence and very high sensitivity to perturbations (Muñoz, 2018). 
The implications of this analogy are profound; it suggests that cognitive 
systems are softl assembled and mostly characterized by 
interaction-dominant modes of engagement with the environment in the 
way many complex natural systems are. Multiple scales, accordingly, 
would be involved in any cognitive phenomenon (such is the proposal) 
and the underlying processes cannot be easily compartmentalized into 
neural activity, bodily dynamics, and agent-environment coupling as 
(causally and conceptually) distinct explanatory domains. This is in 
opposition with traditional assumptions which map functions to neural 
structures/processes in that both the mapping itself is put into question 
as well as the concept of neatly defined functions that pre-exist cognitive 
performance in contrast to functions that emerge dynamically with the 
performance (see Anderson et al., 2013; Pessoa, 2014). 
Evidence and arguments in favour of this dynamical perspective 
have been criticized for different reasons. These include (1) empirical 
concerns relating to measures of power-law scaling, (2) the unwarranted 
implication that these measures necessarily always entail all or any of 
the associated properties, such as self-organized criticality, soft assem-
bly, interaction-dominant dynamics, and context sensitivity, and (3) the 
lack of models or principled arguments whereby we should expect 
human cognition to behave in analogous ways to other complex, self- 
organized natural processes. The first and second criticisms are, in our 
opinion, satisfactorily addressed in Van Orden et al. (2005). There, aside 
from technical consideration in measuring fractal scaling, the authors 
propose that the appropriate point of view is to consider fractal scaling 
as a consequence of criticality and not the opposite. It follows that the 
relevant level of study should be that of emergent phenomena and 
fractal scaling themselves. 
1.1. Criticality, models, and cognitive processes 
The third line of criticism (Farrell et al., 2006; Wagenmakers et al., 
2012) asserts that (a) criticality is only well understood in simple and 
abstract models (e.g., the Ising model, rice piles, the branching process 
model) which are generally highly homogeneous and operate under very 
specific boundary conditions, and (b) advocates for power-law scaling 
approaches simply assume that cognitive systems displaying power-law 
scaling share properties with these abstract models, and this is not 
necessarily true. The conclusions drawn, therefore, would seem to operate 
at best at the level of an analogy or metaphor rather than as principled 
models that can yield falsifiable predictions (Wagenmakers et al., 2012; 
Mora and Bialek, 2011; Muñoz, 2018). Note that this does not put into 
question the role of metaphor in theory and model-making. Valid models 
may be framed as analogies (as opposed to simulacra) as proposed by 
Hesse (1966), (see also Morgan and Morrison, 1999). However, some 
ideas in science play only or mostly the role of metaphors or analogues (a 
role we do not discount), while others can act as metaphors as well as lead 
to generative models (which one could consider formalizable metaphors). 
The criticism expresses the worry that, without the support of specifically 
cognitive models, power-law scaling approaches fail to suitably explain 
certain types of criticality as a consequence of relevant properties of 
cognition. 
To put this worry in other words, the mere observation of typical 
markers of criticality in cognitive systems does not guarantee enough of 
a distinction between such systems and other physical systems. There is 
a concern about underspecification and insufficiently justified analo-
gies. This is partially considered in Van Orden et al. (2005), where the 
authors argue that “[a] fractal account does not necessarily require 
details of internal mechanisms to answer the theoretical questions that 
are posed. In the case of opaque complex systems, it is their behavior 
that motivates the hypothesis of self-organization, not the details of 
interacting primitives” (p. 122). However, even if microscopic details 
could be disregarded (and some may contest this), our position is that in 
cognitive processes there are meso-scale factors that matter and are 
specifically cognitive (e.g., agent-environment asymmetries, processes 
of learning and adaptation), and that adequate scaling measures can 
capture some of these properties better than flat one-dimensional ex-
ponents. To fully answer this worry, we should provide an argument 
concerning the organization of cognitive agents and the reasons that this 
organization leads us to expect that criticality should be (in the appro-
priate circumstances) an observed phenomenon in cognitive systems. 
We offer an argument to address this last line of criticism. We argue 
that the main problem with power-law scaling approaches is that they 
are based on measures that have been developed in models in which the 
underlying organization is completely ‘flat’ or homogeneous, and 
therefore cannot capture specific organizational aspects of cognitive 
systems. A fundamental feature of cognitive organization, according to 
various theories of embodied cognition, concerns the ongoing, precari-
ous, and self-sustaining integration of the agent’s own identity (Di Paolo 
et al., 2017; Kauffman, 2000; Juarrero, 2000; Silberstein and Chemero, 
2012; Varela, 1997). For instance, Bailly and Longo (2008) propose that 
living matter behaves in an ‘extended critical situation’, sustained far 
from equilibrium by ‘the dynamic integration and the regulation of its 
components’ We should expect that this central feature of all extant 
cognitive and living systems constrains the kinds of viable cognition in 
general. If we can derive from the basic requirement of active, far from 
equilibrium integration an expectation that such systems will show 
properties of criticality, soft assembly, etc. then we will have shown that 
the empirical observations verify an expected consequence of how 
cognitive agents are put together. The arrow would be inverted from an 
inference about mechanisms following observed critical behavior, to a 
verification of a (particular kind of) critical behavior that should be 
expected in self-integrating systems. In addition, cognitive systems 
would be located within but also distinguished from the rest of the 
family of physical systems that exhibit critical behavior (since not all of 
them exhibit the property of dynamic integration). 
1.2. Alternative indices of fractal scaling 
Before expanding this argument, we shall admit that picture por-
trayed above about flat exponents of criticality is, to some extent, a 
simplification. Although much work relies on uni-dimensional scaling 
exponents, a variety of more complex methods exist (Kello et al., 2010). 
Multifractal scaling indices, for instance, extend critical exponents into 
a continuous dimension of exponents, offering a richer characterization of 
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the different temporal scales of a system. It has been argued that they 
better characterize the multiplicative interactions in a cognitive systems 
(Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010). Similarly, recurrence quantification analyses 
offer better characterizations of the nonlinear dynamics of a system 
(Wallot et al., 2015). These more elaborated methods, however, are sus-
ceptible to the same criticisms we have discussed: it is in general not 
obvious how to connect the observed indices with the underlying, spe-
cifically cognitive processes or how these underlying processes relate to 
the analytical solutions of simpler models of criticality. 
Closer to our perspective, some techniques are also more precise in 
depicting the relationships between different systems or subsystems. For 
instance, complexity matching analysis shows that interacting systems 
tend to attune their behavior at different scales and so enhance their 
coordination and maximize information transfer (Abney et al., 2014). It 
has been noted however that in some cases the matching of long-term 
fluctuations could be the result of short-term coupling processes 
(Delignières and Marmelat, 2014), and that apparently similar matching 
phenomena could in principle be divided between simple statistical 
matching and genuine complexity matching, without fractal exponents 
giving us information about one situation or the other. Still, some 
methods have been proposed that could overcome these difficulties 
(Almurad et al., 2018). For example, detrended cross-correlation anal-
ysis (a generalization of detrended fluctuation analysis) allows the 
investigation of power-law cross-correlations between time series in the 
presence of nonstationarity (Podobnik and Stanley, 2008). It has been 
proposed that such cross-correlation analysis, in combination with 
different time lags, can be used to describe the type of interaction in 
complexity matching processes (Almurad et al., 2018). Multifractal 
signatures in complexity matching have also been proposed to provide a 
more detailed view of the interaction between processes (Delignières 
et al., 2016). We believe that these advances move in the right direction, 
from flat fractal exponents to more detailed depictions of the 
non-uniform interactions in complex processes. Still, the problem lies in 
that it is not obvious how to interpret these measures and, as their 
proponents recognise, caution is needed (Delignières et al., 2016). One 
of the advantages of fractal exponents, is that at least in toy models they 
have a direct relation with the analytical exponents (e.g., the behavior of 
order parameters or the susceptibility of a system) derived from the 
analysis of critical phase transitions. These exponents can even be linked 
to families of phenomena like the Ising or percolation universality 
classes (Fisher, 1974). Although these different measures advance in 
solving some of the shortcomings of fractal exponents for understanding 
cognitive systems, they move further away from our analytical under-
standing of critical phase transitions and the insights found in models of 
criticality. 
The criticism that we wish to respond to, and that is not entirely 
misguided in our view, is the one that says that ideas such as soft as-
sembly and criticality are only metaphorical and that the often-invoked 
analogy with physical systems that show similar observable character-
istics lacks cognitive specificity. We answer this criticism by providing a 
conceptual intermediary justification–in the form of models that can 
capture cognitive relevant properties, such as agent-environment 
asymmetries, and the requirement of sustained integration–that ad-
dresses the question of why we should expect certain behavior from 
specifically cognitive systems, and this goes beyond (but does not 
negate) the analogical links to physical systems. 
We propose that the development of indices of criticality that are 
connected with the organizational structure of a cognitive system can 
address this gap between the observable properties and the specific 
underlying processes that generate them. We support our claim by 
reviewing recent analytical work of this type of measures in kinetic Ising 
models of infinite size (Aguilera and Di Paolo, 2019), connected with 
work in Integrated Information Theory. We model the existence of 
differentiated functional regions and show how integrated information 
φ at different parts of the system is related to the specific underlying 
organization. In this way, the proposed model, while remaining abstract, 
captures aspects of the level of autonomy and agency of different parts of 
a system that have been proposed in theories of embodied cognition (Di 
Paolo et al., 2017). Finally, we comment on how this kind of work can 
help integrate different views concerning the properties of neural 
organization. 
2. Integrated information as susceptibility to organizational 
changes near criticality 
Systems operating in a critical regime generate power-law scaling 
only for specific dependent variables and under specific conditions. 
Different methods can detect the presence of power-law scaling in the 
system’s variables, but they do not provide a clear picture of how these 
variables interact or what role they play (if any) in the emergence of the 
critical phenomenon. For this reason, claims about soft assembly or 
interaction-dominant dynamics after detecting power-law scaling can be 
quite vague. Moreover, such claims make it difficult to address questions 
about what is and what is not part of the interaction-dominant system: 
Can an observed variable display power-law scaling without being part 
of an interaction-dominant ensemble? And the other way around? The 
problem with uniform power-law scaling analyses is that they measure a 
one-dimensional index, a critical exponent, that describes how close the 
fluctuation of a signal is to scale invariance. To capture the specificity of 
the organization of a system, a measure needs to have some capacity to 
reveal relational properties between its components. This should not be 
mistaken with a reductionist ambition of disassembling an emergent 
process into independent components. But if the emergent phenomena 
of fractal scaling in cognitive phenomena is the object of study, we 
should at least be able to identify the boundaries of the irreducible 
interactive system producing it. By themselves, power-law measures are 
inadequate for this task. And even if heuristic methods can be devel-
oped, as in cases like complexity matching experiments, the interpre-
tation of the results is far from obvious (Delignières et al., 2016). 
Instead of power-law scaling and long-range correlations, critical 
behavior can be more precisely described by a divergence of the sys-
tem’s susceptibility or Fisher information of the system, depicting a 
second order phase transition (Binder, 1987; Salinas, 2001; Prokopenko 
et al., 2011). The susceptibility of a system is a measure of how sensitive 
a quantity of the system is to changes in the underlying parameters (e.g., 
how much a material will become magnetized if we change a magnetic 
field). We can think of classical models of ferromagnetic phase transi-
tions (e.g., Ising models). The simplest Ising model showing a critical 
phase transition is the Curie–Weiss magnet (also known as the 
infinite-range Ising model, Kochmański et al., 2013). In this model, units 
are influenced by an external magnetization H and all of them are 
coupled to other units with a coupling parameter J. If we consider the 
average activity of units for H = 0 for a model of infinite size (Fig. 1A), 
we observe that there is a critical point at J = 1, in which there is a 
symmetry-breaking transition that goes from a disordered state (m = 0) 
to an ordered state (in which m is polarized to either a positive or 
negative value). This critical point is characterized by power-law dis-
tributions of different variables of the model (Kochmański et al., 2013). 
For example, if we think of the duration of ‘avalanches’ in the system, 
the equivalent kinetic Curie–Weiss model of infinite size is equivalent to 
a branching process (Slade, 2008) where the size of an avalanche has the 
form P(S) ∼ 1̅ ̅π√ S
− 1.5 (Fig. 1B). It is well known that the magnetic sus-
ceptibility – the derivative of the magnetization with respect to an 
applied magnetic field – has a power-law singularity diverging at the 
critical point (Fig. 1C, dashed). Similarly, the susceptibility with respect 
to the coupling constant J (Fig. 1C, solid) also diverges at the critical 
point. A high susceptibility in these examples implies that the behavior 
of the system (i.e. its average magnetization) is going to change more 
significantly with changes in the parameters than in cases of lower 
susceptibility. This critical transition is essentially a one-dimensional 
phenomenon in a system with a homogeneous distribution, in which 
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changes in one parameter (e.g., external field, temperature, or coupling 
strength) define a second order phase transition (Salinas, 2001). 
We can apply this more principled characterization of criticality to 
neural systems. Recent work on Integrated Information Theory (Agui-
lera and Di Paolo, 2019; Aguilera, 2019) has shown that (in some models 
and under specific assumptions) integrated information can be 
described by a type of susceptibility that is no longer one-dimensional 
but that takes into account the different ways in which a system can 
be decomposed. The conclusion is that a system is more integrated when 
it is more susceptible to parametric changes caused by partitions in the 
system. A partition consists in breaking the coupling between two parts 
of the system (and replacing their mutual influence by uncorrelated 
noise, see Fig. 1D). Specifically, integrated information depends on the 
susceptibility of the system in the direction of the parameter space 
determined by the minimum information partition (i.e., the partition 
that has the least susceptibility, Fig. 1E). Susceptibility can be measured 
in different directions of the parameter space, and the minimum infor-
mation partition indicates the partition that defines the least susceptible 
direction for all possible partitions. In other words, if we think of all the 
possible interventions we could make in the internal processes that 
compose a system, then the system would be highly integrated if it is 
very sensitive to any of the interventions that challenge its integrity. 
This is equivalent to saying that a system showing high integrated in-
formation is one that is very susceptible to events that affect the 
coherence of its internal structure. 
Following this, we can offer a different reading of what it means for a 
cognitive system to be in a critical state. Although a system can be in a 
critical point with respect to an external parameter (e.g., temperature), a 
system can also be critical with respect to the parameters of its internal 
organization (e.g., internal couplings). This is a sense of criticality that 
connects more directly to questions about a cognitive system’s organi-
zation such as whether it is softly assembled or interaction-dominant. 
We believe that the extended characterization of critical transitions as 
susceptibilities in multiple directions, in particular the ones that corre-
spond to different possible partitions of the system, can bridge the gap 
between macroscopic descriptions of scale-invariant dynamics and the 
underlying processes. This would help address the worry that conclu-
sions about a system’s organization from observed power laws are too 
general to distinguish cognitive systems from other physical systems. 
Integrated information can give a better characterization of the inter-
action dominant-structure of a specifically cognitive system. We illus-
trate this idea with an example. 
3. Power-law scaling vs integrated information in an agent- 
environment system 
To clarify the difference between power-law scaling and an inte-
grated information approach to criticality, we use an example we pre-
sent elsewhere (Aguilera and Di Paolo, 2019). The model shows how 
susceptibility at critical points describes the degree of individual and 
joint integration of two interacting systems composed of a large number 
of interacting units. There is a system A (an ‘agent’) in interaction with 
an ‘environment’ E (Fig. 2A). Units in A, representing different internal 
variables, have a recurrent coupling value JR. Variables (units) in E are 
only connected to units in A, with bidirectional coupling values JC. We 
have shown analytically that the system is at a critical point when JR =
2 − J2C (Fig. 2). At this critical point, both the agent A and the joint 
system AE (composed of both A and E) reach the point of maximum 
information integration φ, i.e., maximally interaction-dominant dy-
namics (Fig. 2B and C shows φ for JC = 0.8 and JC = 1.2). 
How easy is it to capture the underlying organization of the system 
from measuring data series using power-law scaling approaches and 
using integrated information? In other words, how easy is it to delineate 
the boundary that divides an agent and the environment? For infinite 
systems, φ can be computed analytically. We show that φA and φAE 
Fig. 1. Behavior of an infinite-range Ising model with a critical point. (A) Values of average activity m respect to couplings J, showing a critical point at J = 1. (B) 
Power law distribution of avalanche size S at the critical point J = 1, where probability avalanche size is defined by P(S) ∼ 1̅ ̅π√ S
− 1.5. (C) Susceptibility respect to the 
magnetic field ∂m∂H (dashed line) and respect to the coupling value 
∂m
∂J , both diverging at the critical point. (D) Example of a partition removing part of the connections 
in the system. Red lines represent couplings affected by the partition and black lines those not affected. (E) Integrated information φ for the minimum partition, 
diverging at the critical point similarly to ∂m∂J . 
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Fig. 2. Asymmetric interaction in a kinetic 
Ising model. (A) Basic agent A with self coupling 
JR, connected to an environment E with bidi-
rectional couplings JC. (B, C) Values of inte-
grated information for the agent and 
environment nodes of the model at stability for 
JC = 0.8 (left) and JC = 1.2 (right) and different 
values of J. (D) Constants K multiplying the 
diverging integrated information value near the 
critical point JR = 2 − JC2, showing the level of 
irreducibility of system A and system AE. 
Figure adapted from Aguilera and Di Paolo 
(2019), were a detailed analysis can be found.   
Fig. 3. Power-law scaling and integrated information analyses. (A) Time series representing simulations of SA(t), SE(t) and SAE(t) for different values of JC (an offset 
value has been added for visiblity). (B) Power law exponents of the behavior of the systems in Fig. 2, measured using Detrended Fluctuation Analysis (DFA). Ex-
ponents α = 1 represent scale-free dynamics, while β = 0.5 represent independent random noise. (C) Integrated information of different clusters of the system, 
showing a transition from integration in Ato integration in AE. 
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diverge at the critical point and tend to infinity. However, their value is 
multiplied by a constant that depends on the coupling strength JC 
(Fig. 2D), showing that for JC < 1, A is more integrated than the joint 
system AE. For the other conditions (JC > 1) the opposite occurs and A 
and E do not operate as differentiated systems. This shows – in the 
idealized case of an infinite system with homogeneous regions – how we 
can determine the boundary of an interaction-dominant ensemble. 
Interaction-dominance, therefore, does not imply the dissolution of a 
cognitive system into its environmental background. 
Can the same be done for a finite system using either power-law 
scaling measures or integrated information? We illustrate each case in 
a finite version of the model at the critical point JR = 2 − JC2, where 
regions A and E have N = 1000 units each. We run a simulation for 105 
steps to reach a stationary regime, and run for 106 further updates 




i∈Asi(t), SE(t) = 1N
∑
i∈Esi(t) and SAE(t) = 12N
∑
i∈AEsi(t) (Fig. 3A) to 
apply a power-law scaling analysis. We also calculate the distributions of 
P(SA(t)), P(SE(t)), P(SAE(t)) using the methods described in Aguilera 
(2019) to compute φ. 
To measure the presence of power-law scaling we apply Detrended 
Fluctuation Analysis (DFA), a standard tool for characterizing the 
exponent of the scaling. As an example, we apply DFA to the activation 
time series SA(t), SE(t) and SAE(t). The DFA algorithm extracts an index α, 
which indicates the presence of long-range correlations when 
0.5 < α < 1.5, being α = 0.5 the case with no temporal correlations. With 
this measure, we can inspect the behavior of the long-term correlations 
of the activity of units in region A, region E, and the combination of both. 
In this way, we test what power-law scaling can tell us about the internal 
assembly of the systems components. 
Results are shown in Fig. 3B. First, we observe that for the subsystem 
E, α goes to 0.5 when JC is small, indicating the absence of correlations in 
the time series. When JC is large, the system always presents long-range 




and JR = 0 (A 
has no self-coupling and its activity is only correlated through E) A and E 
still present long-range correlations although they are not, individually, 
interaction-dominant. The DFA analysis captures the long-range corre-
lations generated by the presence of a critical point but, as these long- 
range correlations are propagated throughout the system, the measure 
cannot identify which parts of the system are organized in an 
interaction-dominant ensemble. This means that, even if we observe 
through power-law scaling measures that units in A behave with 
interaction-dominant dynamics, it is unclear whether this behavior is 
due to the self-coupling of units within A, the interaction with E, or a 
combination of both. There is a disconnection between the dynamical 
effects that we can measure using scaling measures, and the mechanisms 
that generate the observed patterns. For instance, critical dynamical 
patterns in the brain might be caused by neural mechanisms, but they 
might as well be generated by external power-law patterns (in the body 
or the environment) driving their dynamics. The point is that power-law 
scaling analysis of data series does not provide an explanation of where 
and how interaction-dominant dynamics are generated. 
Let us now analyze the integrated information of the system. We 
numerically compute the values of integration for networks of size N =
1000 for regions A and E (Fig. 3C). The integration of unit E alone is zero 
(since it has no self-connections that can be partitioned). As the coupling JC 
changes, we observe that integration φ can distinguish which region of the 
system is more integrated. For low values of JC, self-couplings JR dominate 
at the critical point and unit A is the most integrated part of the system, 
whereas when agent-environment couplings JC dominate at the critical 
point and the joint system AEis the most integrated. Thus, a measure that is 
related with a critical susceptibility of the system in response to its possible 
partitions is more effective for characterizing its organization. One- 
dimensional indices of criticality are suited for completely homogeneous 
systems. In systems comprising regions with different mechanisms, mea-
sures of criticality using integrated information, reflecting its susceptibility 
to a multiplicity of parameters (i.e., possible partitions), can better capture 
aspects of the organization that are missed by traditional measures. 
Here we have measured critical integration in a model, but how can 
such measures be performed using experimental data in the laboratory? 
Several measures of integration are discussed in the extensive literature 
on the topic (see e.g., Mediano et al., 2019), although the relation of the 
different versions of φ with criticality and susceptibility indices should 
be carefully reviewed as indicated by Aguilera (2019), Aguilera and Di 
Paolo (2019). 
4. Extended critical integration: adaptivity, robustness, 
autonomy 
We have proposed that integrated information and susceptibility to 
internal partitions are better suited for characterizing the processes of a 
system showing interaction-dominant dynamics. How should we inter-
pret this proposal in terms of the properties of critical systems? Intui-
tively, high integration suggests a high level of robustness, while 
paradoxically high susceptibility indicates a degree of fragility in the 
system. Traditionally, criticality is understood as a state maintaining a 
compromise between robustness (resilience to external perturbations, 
which is a property of ordered phases) and flexibility (responsiveness to 
environmental stimuli, which is a property of disordered phases) 
(Muñoz, 2018). Moreover, some critical systems have been shown to 
display dynamical properties that are robust to changes in their struc-
ture (Goodarzinick et al., 2018). High susceptibility is also linked with a 
large dynamic range of responses of a system to diverse intensities of 
stimuli, where variations in input correspond robustly to variations in 
response (Kinouchi and Copelli, 2006). Moreover, many properties at 
critical points are quite robust and largely independent of small-scale 
details, giving rise to universality in large-scale behavior (Fisher, 1974). 
Integrated information has also been associated with the autonomy 
of a system (Marshall et al., 2017). From ecological and enactive per-
spectives, interaction-dominant dynamics accompany the emergence of 
intentionality (Van Orden et al., 2003) and adaptive autonomy (Agui-
lera et al., 2015) in an agent. This suggests that a high level of inte-
gration/susceptibility to internal partitions corresponds to the 
constitution of the robust identity of an autonomous system. Still, this 
claim must be taken with caution. In many models, criticality is the 
result of a fine-tuning of the parameters, and in a model like the one 
mentioned in the previous section critical states can rapidly disappear 
with a slight variation of the coupling strength. In contrast with the idea 
in physics of criticality as a singular point, it has been proposed that 
living organisms are ‘extended’ critical systems (Bailly and Longo, 
2008). Recent models shows that extended regions of criticality can be 
generated by the presence of structural heterogeneity in a network 
(Moretti, 2013). Similarly, another model presented by Aguilera and Di 
Paolo (2019) examines a network with three infinite homogeneous re-
gions, (two of them composing a self-regulating agent, A and B, and the 
other its environment E, Fig. 4A). The agent in this model, under 
particular combinations of parameters, has a region (not just a point) of 
high integration robust to changes in the environmental dynamics 
(Fig. 4). 
In general, we suggest that integration/susceptibility to internal 
partitions is a property that allows us to identify a system as interaction- 
dominant (i.e., as a system susceptible to changes in the interactions that 
constitute it). However, not all systems will maintain integration in a 
robust manner, and the emergence of self-sustaining cognitive identities 
(as proposed in enactive perspectives, Di Paolo et al., 2017) should be 
linked with the ability to maintain regions of extended critical integra-
tion in the face of changing interactions with the environment. 
5. Discussion 
Ideas derived from the study of complex systems can be useful for 
measuring the organizational properties of neural and cognitive 
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systems. Power-law scaling measures are some of the most widely used. 
However, these measures have been developed for homogeneous simple 
models. As general emergent parameters, they are too disconnected 
from the specificity of a system’s organization. As an alternative, we 
have considered here an approach to soft assembly based on critical 
integration that can answer the criticisms levelled against inferences 
based only on observed power laws. 
Explicating the relations between criticality and properties of the 
organization of cognitive systems can be achieved by interpreting In-
tegrated Information in terms of the susceptibility of critical systems 
along specific directions in their internal parameter space. These di-
rections are connected to the effects of different partitions affecting the 
interaction between a system’s components. We suggest that research in 
power-law scaling in neuroscience and cognitive science can be further 
developed by taking into account measures that are more directly 
informative about the organization of underlying processes, thus help-
ing clarify how these processes relate to macroscopic measures of 
cognition and other levels of explanation. 
We should note that one drawback of the proposal is that it is based 
on information-theoretical measures that are hard to compute from 
time-series data. Some versions of IIT (Tononi et al., 2016) are known 
for being impracticable in networks larger than 10–15 binary units. 
However, alternatives exist to simplify the calculations and they can be 
applied to time-series data, potentially to those found in behavior sci-
ence (Barrett and Seth, 2011; Oizumi et al., 2016; Mediano et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, we have proposed that, at least for large networks, inte-
grated information can be well captured by susceptibility measures. In 
information theory susceptibility in different directions of the parameter 
space is captured by Fisher information. Although computing Fisher 
information is also more complicated than computing fractal exponents, 
several methods exist for computing susceptibilities from time-series 
data (Klein and Mélard, 1995; Dobos and Abonyi, 2013; Wang and 
Shang, 2018). Moreover, simpler measures in the form of sensitivity to 
perturbations might capture aspects of a system critical integration. A 
simplified way to explore some of the ideas developed here could be to 
quantify how fractal exponents respond in front of different kinds of 
perturbations that challenge the integrity of a system. Studies of sensi-
tivity to context variations can be found in the literature about fractal 
scaling, e.g., experiments in reaction time tasks introducing variability 
in stimulus presentation (Kello et al., 2007), introducing white noise in 
inter-trial intervals (Holden et al., 2011), or a variety oscillatory 
response intervals (Amon et al., 2018). In another study, body-tool in-
teractions where studied by analysing the changes in fractal exponents 
with the introduction of noise in motor behavior (Dotov et al., 2010). 
Finally, we believe that the presented framework could motivate 
experiments aimed at characterizing critical exponents related to the 
integration of a subject’s activity or of the whole coupled system of 
sensorimotor interaction. Susceptibility to changes in the task environ-
ment can be compared to susceptibility to perturbations of the subject’s 
action (e.g., using virtual reality setups or controlled environments like 
in Dotov et al., 2010), potentially reproducing a scenario like the one in 
Fig. 2. All combined, these research avenues can help delineate research 
directions merging experimental tools and guidelines for the design of 
new studies, with models that ground measures and intuitions on 
stronger theoretical foundations. 
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